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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
SHARLEEN M. McREYNOLDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 890172-CA

vs.
GLENN L. McREYNOLDS,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an Order and Judgment arising out of
a bench trial held May 18, 1988.
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated

This Court has jurisdiction
Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp.

1988).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Based

upon

equitable

principles, did

the

trial

court

appropriately determine that since the minor children had been
adequately
purposefully

provided
and

for

by

Plaintiff/Appellant

intentionally

frustrated

the

and

had

efforts by

Defendant/Respondent to exercise his right of visitation was it
appropriate for the District Court not to award judgment for the
unpaid amount of child support based upon Defendant's actions in

frustrating visitation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A, Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings.

This is an

action upon Plaintiff's Petition filed August 4, 1986, to recover
unpaid child support from the Defendant

(R. 55).

In a bench trial, the trial court found that the unpaid
child support for the period August 1986 through May 1988 was the
sum of $3,520.00 (R.284).

The Court also found, however, that

Plaintiff and her current husband purposefully intimidated the
Defendant and frustrated his attempts to visit with his children
by

repeatedly

changing

their

address

and

telephone number.

(R.284).
The Court determined that during the period of time in
question that the children were adequately supported by their
mother and that this was not an action for the benefit of the
children but for the benefit of the mother (R. 328).
In light of the circumstances, it was the Court's opinion
that the conduct of the Plaintiff would constitute contempt of
the Court's Order relative to visitation and in structuring an
equitable remedy, determined that it was appropriate not to grant
Plaintiff judgment for the accrued child support (R. 327-328).
Plaintiff then filed a Motion for New Trial or Amendment of
Judgment on November 7, 1988 (R.298), which motion was denied by
2

the Court's Ruling of February 21, 1989 (R. 326).

Plaintiff,

thereafter, perfected this appeal which goes only to the issue of
judgment for unpaid child support from August, 1986, through May,
1988.
B.

Statement of Facts.

The Plaintiff and Defendant in this

case were divorced on March 7, 1984, pursuant to a Decree of
Divorce entered in Evanston, Wyoming (R. 28). On June 29, 1984,
an Order

and

pertaining

Judgment

was entered

in Davis County, Utah,

to those matters not adjudicated

Decree (R. 52-54).

by the Wyoming

Those matters included the care, custody, and

control of the minor children of the parties, visitation for the
Defendant, child support, alimony, debts and division of marital
property (R. 52-54).
For

purposes

of

this

appeal, the

only

relevant

time

encompasses the period from August 4, 1986, through May, 1988.
(See Appellant's brief page 2.)
Subsequent to the trial, the Court, in its Findings of Fact,
found that the accrued child support during the relevant period
totaled $3,520 (R. 284 P.2).
The trial court found it appropriate not to award judgment
for said amount based upon its findings that the Plaintiff and
her current husband
purposefully intimidated the Defendant and frustrated
his attempts to visit with his children by repeatedly
3

changing their address and telephone numbers, forcing
calls about the children through Plaintiff's present
husband and a law firm answering and forwarding
facility and have not cooperated in meeting scheduled
telephone calls from Defendant and the children as
ordered by Domestic Relations Commissioner, all of
which have caused Defendant considerable anxiety,
expenditure of time and expense which could have been
avoided by reasonable efforts on the part of the
Plaintiff and her husband to afford him his visitation
rights (R. 284, P. 3 ) .
The District Court, in its Ruling denying Plaintiff's Motion
for New Trial, sheds further light on the basis for the Court's
opinion.

The Court specifically determined that there was no

evidence

presented

that

the

children

were

not

adequately

supported during the relevant time and, therefore, concluded that
the Petition for accrued child support payments was not an action
for

the

mother

benefit
(R.

of

328).

the
The

children
Court

but

for

expressed

the

the

benefit

opinion

of

the

that

the

conduct of Plaintiff would constitute a contempt of the Court's
orders relative to visitation (R. 326-328).

The Court further

determined that it would be difficult to fashion a commensurate
punishment

for

determined

that

the

wrong

it was

the

Plaintiff

appropriate

not

to

had

committed

grant

and

Plaintiff

a

judgment for the accrued child support (R. 326-328, Add. A ) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant/Respondent

does not take issue with
4

Plaintiff's

arguments concerning the public policy and concern of insuring
that

children

are

Respondent, however,

properly

supported

stopped

one

consideration of the issues at hand.

step

by

their

parents.

too

short

in their

The Court, in its Ruling on

the Motion for a New Trial, attached as Addendum A, clearly
determined that the children had adequately been provided for
and, consequently, this was "not an action for the benefit of the
children but for the benefit of the mother"
Once

the

Court

has determined

(Addendum A ) .

that the needs of the

children have been adequately attended, the issue then becomes a
question of whether the mother/Plaintiff should be entitled to
recover

the

purposefully

accrued

child

support

payment

when

she

has

interfered with the father/Defendant's right to

visitation as ordered by the Court.
The Court, in fashioning a remedy based upon equitable
principles, could not, in good conscience, award judgment which
would go to the benefit of the mother as opposed to the children
in light of her contemptuous actions.
The Court, in considering the equitable principles stated:
Whenever a party, who, as actor, seeks to set the
judicial machinery in motion and obtain some remedy,
has violated conscience, or good faith, or other
equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then the
doors of the Court will be shut against him; the court
will refuse to award him any remedy (Citation
omitted) (R. 259-260).
5

For the reasons set out, the trial court properly structured
a remedy based upon equitable principles to rectify the wrongs
committed by Plaintiff,
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RELIEVED THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
FROM PAYMENT OF ACCRUED CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS.
A.

The Utah Supreme Court Has Declared that a Trial Court
may Fashion Equitable Orders in Relation to Children
and their Support as is Reasonable and Necessary.

In light of several Utah Supreme Court cases, the issue of
child support gives rise to the argument that the trial court has
power

to

relieve

a non-custodial

parent

of

an

obligation

of

accrued child support, when the custodial parent has thwarted the
non-custodial

parent's right to visitation.

The Utah Supreme

Court has stated:
Though it be conceded that under proper circumstances
a court might make the payments for support money
dependent upon a child's custodian making the child
available for visitation rights, the right of a child
to support is a paramount right which it possesses
quite apart from any consideration relating to the
conduct of its divorced parents (emphasis added).
Earl vs. Earl, 17 Utah 2d 156, 406 P.2d 302 (1965).

In Earl, the

Court pointed out that child support may or may not properly be
made

contingent

upon

compliance

with visitation

rights.

The

decision is not automatic, but depends chiefly on the welfare of
the children involved--their
fact, the Court in Earl

"paramount right to support."

In

ordered a hearing to determine whether
6

it would be desirable to ensure compliance with visitation
rights, by making support payments dependent on those rights.
Id. at 303.
This reasoning is also supported in McClure vs.
Utah 2d 324, 392 P.2d 624 (1964).

Powell, 15

In McClure, the non-custodial

parent was not relieved from child support payments because he
did not pursue that remedy in the proper forum.

However, the

Court did relieve him of the interest on the past due payments.
Id. at 625.

Thus, it is apparent that the courts may relieve a

non-custodial parent from past due installments if that parent
takes action in the proper forum.

This equitable power has been

recognized in the following cases as well.

Baker vs. Baker, 224

P.2d 192 (Utah 1950); Forbush vs. Forbush, 578 P.2d 518 (Utah
1928); Owen vs. Owen, 579 P.2d 911 (Utah 1978).
This same argument is also supported in more recent cases.
In 1988, the Court of Appeals of Utah decided Kelly vs. Draney/
754 P. 2d 92 (1988).

In Kelly, the mother sought unpaid child

support from the father, and the father sought to enforce the
visitation provisions of the divorce decree.

_Id. at 92.

Court held that:
. . .2) trial court properly found mother in contempt
for thwarting father's visitation rights, and 3)
remand was required for trial court to make findings
with respect to how offset of husband's unpaid child
support obligation was applied against contempt fine
or assessment against mother.
7

The

Id. at 92.
Hence, the Court in Kelly, did not prohibit the lower court
from offsetting the father's unpaid child support against the
mother's

contemptuous

visitation.

acts

in

disallowing

In fact, the Court concluded

his

right

to

their opinion by

stating:
We emphasize that we do not intend by these
suggestions to restrict the trial court from making
any orders regarding the children and his parents that
it may deem appropriate in this proceeding or in any
other (emphasis added).
2jd. at 96.
In the present case, Plaintiff-Appellant's conduct would
constitute
visitation.

contempt

of

the

Court's

orders with

regard

to

And, while this is not a contempt proceeding, the

cases above outlined support the argument that the trial court
has the power to make the equitable decision to relieve the
Defendant of his unpaid child support if it deems it appropriate.
This, of course, involves taking into consideration the welfare
of the children and their right to support.
B.

Foregoing an Accrued Child Support Obligation is Not
Improper Per Se, but Depends on the Welfare of the
Children Involved.

In deciding whether or not to order or enforce certain child
support payments, scores of Utah cases have held the children's
welfare and their right to support as paramount:
8

Both parents have an obligation to support their
children.
A child's right to that support is
paramount. Hills vs. Hills, Utah 638 P.2d 516 (1981);
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, U.C.A., 1953,
Section 78-45-3, -4, as amended. However, it does not
necessarily follow that in every instance the noncustodial parent must pay child support to the other
parent.
The trial court may fashion such equitable
orders in relation to the children and their support
as is reasonable and necessary, considering not only
the needs of the children, but also the ability of the
parent to pay. Anderson vs. Anderson, 110 Utah 300,
172 P.2d 132 (1946); U.C.A., 1953, Section 30-3-5, as
amended.
Woodward vs. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985).
The Supreme Court in Race vs. Race, 740 P. 2d 253 (Utah
1987),

points out the necessity of considering

welfare.
importance.

the child's

The facts in Race are of particular interest and
In Race, the trial court made a supplemental order

that the children undergo therapy at Primary Children's Hospital
and

that visitation

be

integrated

into

that

therapy

when

professional opinion deemed it appropriate.

At the same time,

the

support

Court

conditioned

payment

of

child

development of a visitation schedule.

:id. at 256.

upon

the

In the

context of these facts, the Supreme Court stated:
Court-ordered child support is an obligation imposed
for the benefit of the children, not the divorcing
spouse. We find no circumstances here which justifies
the trial court in deferring support until visitation
between the children and their father could be worked
out. In the interim, they needed and were entitled to
his support. Id. at 256.
The decision in Race is not at all inconsistent with the
9

trial court's ruling in the present case.

Rather, focusing on

the children's need and welfare in each case, the two opinions
are completely in accord.

In Race, the children were ordered to

undergo intensive therapy, which is extremely expensive, and was,
in the Court's opinion, necessary.

Thus, the husband's support

payments were greatly needed, such that conditioning them on the
development of a visitation schedule was interfering with the
children's needs.
The trial court's decision in the present case, however, has
not jeopardized the children's welfare.

The Plaintiff is married

to an attorney who earns between $35,000 to $40,000 per year.
The Plaintiff is also capable of earning substantial income as a
realtor.

Moreover, the Plaintiff presented no evidence that her

minor children were inadequately supported during the time when
support was not paid.

Nor was there any evidence that the State

of Utah or any public agency had to provide support, or that any
debt was incurred by the Plaintiff or her new husband as a result
of Defendant's non-payment.

Moreover, the Plaintiff deliberately

interfered with the Defendant's visitation rights.

Thus, in the

present case, the trial court did not overlook or ignore the
"children's paramount right to and need for support."

Rather,

the Court, taking into consideration the Plaintiff's contemptuous
acts,

as well

as the

children's
10

welfare, merely

used

its

equitable powers to formulate a fair solution.

Awarding child

support in arrears would be a windfall to the Plaintiff, not a
needed benefit to the children.
C.

There is an Important Distinction Between Accrued Child
Support and future Child Support-- the two Must be
Analyzed Independently,

Many Utah Supreme Court cases distinguish between accrued
child

support

and

future

child

support.

In Peterson vs.

Peterson, 530 P. 2d 821 (Utah 1974), the custodial mother was
found in contempt for failure to comply with the visitation
provisions of the divorce decree, and the husband's obligation to
provide support was suspended.

On appeal, the Court vacated the

order and ordered the husband to begin paying the accrued child
support plus interest which amounted to $11,600.

However, the

Supreme Court ultimately held that the contempt order and the
suspension of child support were proper.

Id.

at 821.

In

explaining their decision, the Court quoted from Mr. Justice
Crockett's concurring opinion in Wallis vs. Wallis, 9 Utah 2d
237, 342 P.2d 103 (1959):
The support of the provision for alimony and support
money is to provide for the current needs, and not
allow the beneficiary to sit by and permit a
burdensome debt to accumulate and then use it to
harass the defendant.
Peterson vs. Peterson, 530 P. 2d 821 (Utah 1974) (quoting Wallis
vs. Wallis, 9 Utah 2d 237, 342 P. 2d 103 (1959).
11

Counsel for

Defendant

is not asserting that the Plaintiff, in the present

case, deliberately permitted the debt to accumulate in order to
harass the Defendant

at a later time.

However, allowing

the

Plaintiff to collect the accrual of $3,500 when there has been no
apparent need or any debts incurred by the Plaintiff as a result
of the Defendant's nonpayment, would accomplish nothing more than
to harass the Defendant.
Other jurisdictions also support the cancelation of child
support in arrears due to interference with visitation rights,
provided

that

the children's welfare

is not put

in jeopardy.

Clayton vs. Clayton, *** Fla. App. ***, 380 So. 2d 1143 (1980);
Chazen vs. Chazen, 107 Mich. App. 485, 309 N.W. 2d 613; Hudson
vs. Hudson, 412 N.Y.S. 2d 242 (1978); O'Neill vs. O'Neill, 457
N.Y.S. 2d 101 (A.D. 1982); Cooper vs. Cooper, 375 N.E. 2d 925
(111. App. 1978).
This distinction is also consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Race vs. Race, 740 P. 2d 253 (Utah 1987).
the

lower court had

conditioned
schedule.
support

its

payment

Id. at 256.

payments

rights.

simultaneously

(not

upon

given

In Race,

a support order

development

of

a

and

visitation

This order, in effect, conditioned future
past) upon

cooperation

with

visitation

It is this order that the Supreme Court reversed and

remanded.
12

The Supreme Court of Wyoming has also distinguished between
past and future support.

In Broyles vs. Broyles, 711 P. 2d 1119

(Wyo. 1985), the Supreme Court in stating the issues properly
before

the

Court,

made

a

distinction

between

child

support

arrearages and future child support:
Appellee has not perfected an appeal to this court
and, therefore, we will not address whether the denial
of visitation privileges is a defense to an action for
child-support arrearages (emphasis added).
Id. at 1123.
Hence, the Court did not address the issue of accrued child
support, not because

it was improper per se, but because the

father had not filed a necessary cross-appeal.

Only later in

their discussion of future child support, did the Court state the
following:
While many older cases hold to the contrary, the
modern view is that the denial of visitation rights by
the custodial parent or the child does not constitute
a change in circumstances which justifies the
reduction or termination of the noncustodial parent's
support obligation.
Id. at 1127.
Thus, denial of visitation privileges, as a general rule,
might not be a defense to an action for future child support.
However, denial of such privileges has been and properly can be a
defense to an action for child support in arrears if, in the
Court's

discretion,

it

is

equitable
13

and

would

not

adversely

affect the children's welfare.

The distinction between past and

future support is sound for one main reason:

a court, with the

luxury of hindsight, is capable of examining the actions of the
divorced parents as well as the past needs of the children, and
whether

those needs have been met.

However, attempting to

condition parent's acts on the future needs of the children, as
did the Court in Race, puts an undue risk on the children's
welfare.

The decision of the trial court accounts for the

children's welfare and yet prevents a windfall to the Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly exercised its equitable powers by
relieving
$3,560.00.

the

Defendant

from the accrued

child

support of

Current Utah case law holds the children's right to

support as paramount.

However, the cases do not hold that a

custodial parent may deliberately interfere with a non-custodial
parent's right to visitation and automatically receive all unpaid
child support.

The trial court has the power to protect the

welfare of the children and, at the same time, to prevent an
inequitable windfall to either parent.

Therefore, Defendant-

Respondent respectfully requests that the decision of the trial
court be affirmed and that the Defendant be relieved from payment
of $3,520 in unpaid child support.

14

DATED this •<&_ day of July, 1989.

RICHARD B. JOHNSON
Attorney for Plaintixf
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the , <3S~ day of
1989, I mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing to
the following, postage prepaid.
Mr. D. David Lambert
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
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ADDENDUM

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

tf

'4tf

D. DAVID LAMBERT, (1872) for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345

Our File No. 18,889

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SHARLEEN M. McREYNOLDS
aka SHARLEEN COLTON,
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR
AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

GLENN L. McREYNOLDS,
Civil No. CV-87-352
Judge George E. Ballif

Defendant.

Plaintiff, through her counsel, hereby moves the Court to open this judgment,
amend the Conclusions of Law and direct the entry of a new judgment on the single
issue of the delinquent child support during the period August, 1986 through May, 1988.
This motion does not involve receiving any new evidence.
This motion is made pursuant to Rule 59(a), U.R.CP. and is accompanied by a
supporting memorandum of points and authorities.
DATED this _£

day of November, 1988.

b.

-*Wll

D. DAVfD LAMB
HOWARD, LEWIS &. PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to
the following, postage prepaid, this

1""^ day of November, 1988.

Mr. Richard B. Johnson
Jackman and Johnson
Attorneys for Defendant
1327 South 800 East #300
Orem, UT 84058
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